“Perfect imitation isn’t imitation.”

Of course it is. Arguments of the form “a is not a” are logically invalid.

“They’re an apt example precisely because they’re things that we routinely make perfect copies of and they have some small value.”

They lack feelings about themselves, and are thus a nonexample. Worse, they’re a special case — their value is /entirely limited/ to the value of the information they contain (you /can/ make this argument about humans, but not without being nihilistic.)

And you’re still making the wrong argument. The value of the copy to everyone else is unimportant. The question is the value of the copy to the original.

“Distinct how?”

In that it’s not the same. You can set them side-by-side and see that there are two of them, the one on the right and the one on the left.

“It occupies a slightly different location?”

It occupies a different location, it is made of different matter, and it constitutes a seperate consciouness. Object A doesn’t experience what Object B experiences, nor is the reverse true.

“In every other way it’s you.”

It’s like you. That doesn’t make it actually you. In the only way that matters (that being identity) it’s not you, you are.

“If exposed to the same stimuli immediately after the copying process, both of you will react the same way.”

But you won’t be. Your situations are different. And that’s not the intent in any case. The point is moot.

“Are you positing that the self incorporates some intangible, uncopyable “soul”? What special quality of “you-ness” can’t be copied?”

Nope. Only that you — the you that you are right now — didn’t move. It’s still there. And even if you kill it, it’s just been killed. The copy is not the original, and can never be.

Continuity of being as you put it. I would disagree that you lose this when you fall asleep. Maybe I’m just a light sleeper…but don’t you dream? Even in dreams, I’m typically conscious of the fact that I’m dreaming.

Of course I dream, but not all the time. And it’s those “in between” bits, where you’re just plainly asleep, that you lose continuity.

I would also disagree that you are 100% memories and thoughts; a big part of your make-up is physiological. If you remove these biological elements, you’re changing the equation. How much testosterone does my computer replicant receive in a day?

That’s part of the reason why some transhumanists advocate full-body simulation. (The book I’m reading now, Permutation City, uses full-body simulation for all uploads.) And, in most fiction, the upload retains some kind of roundabout gland emulation even if they’re not full-body.

There are a lot of possibilities though. Egan’s Ndoli device, for example, didn’t actually copy a person’s brain; it just observed their behavior and tried to predict what they’d do next. Eventually, after running in parallel with the subject for a couple decades, it could model the person’s behavior with 100% accuracy and control of their body could be turned over to it. (And most of the subject’s brain could then be surgically removed.)

Anyway, if you carry the physiological argument far enough you’re changing “who you are” every time you decide to eat a certain food or breathe the air in a certain place. Those various substances influence your thought processes in some small way. You’re constantly editing yourself.

I would also disagree that you are 100% memories and thoughts; a big part of your make-up is physiological. If you remove these biological elements, you’re changing the equation. How much testosterone does my computer replicant receive in a day?

Clone. Murder clone. Transplant brain. Repeat.

/You/ don’t wake up as the copy. The copy wakes up with the /impression/ that it’s you.

Semantics. Perfect imitation isn’t imitation.

PEGs aren’t really a relevant example, as they don’t have feelings.

They’re an apt example precisely because they’re things that we routinely make perfect copies of and they have some small value. The fact that no one in their right mind cares if they have an “original” MP3 or the thousandth copy of said MP3 should tell you something. We treat them the same because they are the same.

And you’re still making the wrong argument. It’s not that the copy has less value than the original. The problem is that the copy /is distinct from/ the original.

Semantics again. Distinct how? It occupies a slightly different location? In every other way it’s you. If exposed to the same stimuli immediately after the copying process, both of you will react the same way. Are you positing that the self incorporates some intangible, uncopyable “soul”? What special quality of “you-ness” can’t be copied?