#910
1:25 am, Wednesday, October 3rd, 2007Today we had lunch at the Suchada’s Thai Cuisine. I had the pork Pad Thai; extremely generous portions, pretty spicy, but no egg or lime wedges. We also had a cold summer roll appetizer with peanut sauce. They were good, but not as good as the ones we had at Pho Hoang’s in Federal Way.
After that we went to ShopKo and got Mario Strikers Charged (Wii), a second Nerf Maverick, 30 extra darts, and Jenga (I got hooked playing it at AU — had to get my own set). Of course, when we got home, a massive Nerf battle ensued. It was awesome. Like Hot Fuzz, but with foam and suction cups. I really like the new Maverick colors. The arsenal:
Mario Strikers Charged is kinda like Super Monkey Ball soccer, but with better controls and more features. Jones got it for his Wii a while back but I got the impression from his comments that it was just “okay.” (Maybe that was his well-known tendency for understatement at work.) Personally, I think it’s fantastic. I played through the lessons, won the Fire Cup, did best-of-three against someone named “sparky” via the WiFi connection, and, after running back to ShopKo for a second Nunchuk attachment, played a few games against Brett. (He won them all, but the margins were thin). BTW, if anyone wants to go head-to-head with me in MSC, my friend code is 090306 573436.
(If you’re not into Greg Egan or Transhuman Space, skip this section.) I was flipping through Axiomatic a couple days ago and came across this passage about uploading that I really liked. It’s not germane to anything in this post, but I wanted to share it anyway:
The argument was so familiar that I could run through it all in my head, without even waking her.
LORAINE: I don’t want to be imitated by a computer after I’m dead. What use would that be to me?
DAVID: Don’t knock imitation — life consists of imitation. Every organ in your body is constantly being rebuilt in its own image. Every cell that divides is dying and replacing itself with imposters. Your body doesn’t contain a single atom you were born with — so what gives you your identity? It’s a pattern of information, not a physical thing. And if a computer started imitating your body — instead of your body imitating itself — the only real difference would be that the computer would make fewer mistakes.
It’s funny how the best arguments for uploading are usually also arguments for nihilism… most of them, if you dig down a bit, seem to go: “Nothing has inherent value (or really matters anyway) so why not do what’s easy and comfortable?” I don’t like that. There must be some way to reconcile a (personal) pro-uploading stance with the belief that life has value.
Anyway. Sean, my oldest friend, is going to be in Pullman this weekend — we’ll have to get him to play some MSC.
Worked out 10/1.
October 3rd, 2007 at 2:39 pm
Is there a definition of uploading I’m not familiar with? Are you saying data gets taken down, and then it is replaced once again by uploaders?
Anyway, that quote brought up a question I frequently discuss among friends: How much of my body can I exchange and still be myself?
If I lose an arm and replace it with a robotic arm, am I still myself? If my kidney fails and I get it replace, am I still myself?
I would argue yes to both of those. If so, at what point am I no longer myself. Does 50% of my body still have to be myself to be considered myself? Or is it just a matter of slow assimilation, meaning I can only change my body piece by piece and once changed, that piece is considered to be mine.
My final answer has always been that all body parts are changeable in my opinion, except the brain. I personally think the brain is what defines us and I can change my heart, my skull, my limbs, my stomach, my eyes, my nose, my ears, etc, and I’d still be myself. The brain contains all my data, contains my characteristics, my behavior, etc. With a totally different body, I can still exhibit those things. However, without the brain, I would just be somebody else.
Just like people with multiple personalities. Even though they are using the same body, I would consider each personality to be a different person.
October 3rd, 2007 at 2:55 pm
Uploading is another term for mind transfer. The brain is the entire point of the thing — it’s what all the debate centers around. I.e., if you can scan and simulate your brain perfectly (“upload”), is the simulation really you? It would have all your memories, habits, emotional responses, etc.
October 4th, 2007 at 9:36 am
Incredibly interesting subject. I’m amazed neither of you haven’t figured out the answer. Another way to think about this is if you had a different parent, say your mother was a different woman or your father a different man, would you only be half of the person you are now? Nature vs. Nuture. Are you a collective of the experiences you have had or would you be you or a close version regardless of experiences? As far as uploading, aren’t copies always less than the original? And where is that save button?
October 4th, 2007 at 2:01 pm
> Another way to think about this is if you had a different parent…
Arg, no, that’s an entirely different issue. :P
Regardless of whether nature or nuture (or both) made you who you are, uploading would capture all of it.
Besides, they’re fundamentally different questions. The “nature vs. nurture” debate involves a lot of unknowns and is more a question for science. Uploading is a purely philosophical issue because we know all the relevant parameters.
> As far as uploading, aren’t copies always less than the original?
The assumption that the scanning and simulaton technologies are perfect is an intrinsic part of the hypothetical.
October 4th, 2007 at 6:20 pm
Still not the same though. If you are looking at something that shares your exact thoughts, emotions, etc. – you’re still around after you kill it (because I’m going to do him before he does me).
If you are interested in leaving a legacy after your body turns to dust; sure, a computer copy of your experiences and thoughts is fine. But typically, this is seen as an alternative for immortality – I’m not buying it.
That’s why I’m going to have my brain transplanted. That’s the only way.
October 4th, 2007 at 8:16 pm
The problem is this. (Call it the Thomas Riker Scenario if you like.)Suppose there is someone exactly like you. You clone or doppelganger, but more so. They’re exactly like you, right down to your brain structure and pattern.
Is this you?
Of course not. You’re still around, and even after you’re dead, that’ll still be someone else. Just like the very realistic simulation of you in the computer.
The copy isn’t the original, and therefore uploading would seem to have no advantage for the uploader.
October 5th, 2007 at 12:44 am
Thinking of it as “the copy” is part of the problem. A perfect duplicate of yourself is still you, just with a slightly different perspective. Why should an “original” have any more value than a copy when the two are indistinguishable? Make a copy of a JPEG and see if you have different feelings about one or the other.
Now, there’s no continuity of being, sure. But you lose that every time you go to sleep anyway. Being copied would be like going to sleep and waking up in a different place. You’d just “wake up” as the copy. What confuses people is that you’d wake up as the original too. For some reason, it takes a while to grok that.
October 5th, 2007 at 12:31 pm
/You/ don’t wake up as the copy. The copy wakes up with the /impression/ that it’s you.
It remembers (inaccurately) being you. It thinks like you (although likely less as time goes on and you go your seperate ways.) But it still /isn’t/ you. And the only way you can discount that concept is the nihilistic argument — you aren’t you either, so why does it matter?
JPEGs aren’t really a relevant example, as they don’t have feelings.
And you’re still making the wrong argument. It’s not that the copy has less value than the original. The problem is that the copy /is distinct from/ the original. It doesn’t continue the original’s life, except from its perspective.
October 5th, 2007 at 2:14 pm
Semantics. Perfect imitation isn’t imitation.
They’re an apt example precisely because they’re things that we routinely make perfect copies of and they have some small value. The fact that no one in their right mind cares if they have an “original” MP3 or the thousandth copy of said MP3 should tell you something. We treat them the same because they are the same.
Semantics again. Distinct how? It occupies a slightly different location? In every other way it’s you. If exposed to the same stimuli immediately after the copying process, both of you will react the same way. Are you positing that the self incorporates some intangible, uncopyable “soul”? What special quality of “you-ness” can’t be copied?
October 5th, 2007 at 6:14 pm
Continuity of being as you put it. I would disagree that you lose this when you fall asleep. Maybe I’m just a light sleeper…but don’t you dream? Even in dreams, I’m typically conscious of the fact that I’m dreaming.
I would also disagree that you are 100% memories and thoughts; a big part of your make-up is physiological. If you remove these biological elements, you’re changing the equation. How much testosterone does my computer replicant receive in a day?
Clone. Murder clone. Transplant brain. Repeat.
October 5th, 2007 at 7:24 pm
Of course I dream, but not all the time. And it’s those “in between” bits, where you’re just plainly asleep, that you lose continuity.
That’s part of the reason why some transhumanists advocate full-body simulation. (The book I’m reading now, Permutation City, uses full-body simulation for all uploads.) And, in most fiction, the upload retains some kind of roundabout gland emulation even if they’re not full-body.
There are a lot of possibilities though. Egan’s Ndoli device, for example, didn’t actually copy a person’s brain; it just observed their behavior and tried to predict what they’d do next. Eventually, after running in parallel with the subject for a couple decades, it could model the person’s behavior with 100% accuracy and control of their body could be turned over to it. (And most of the subject’s brain could then be surgically removed.)
Anyway, if you carry the physiological argument far enough you’re changing “who you are” every time you decide to eat a certain food or breathe the air in a certain place. Those various substances influence your thought processes in some small way. You’re constantly editing yourself.
October 5th, 2007 at 8:46 pm
“semantics” are the meanings of words, and discussing them is not invalid. Strictly speaking, I wasn’t arguing them either.
“Perfect imitation isn’t imitation.”
Of course it is. Arguments of the form “a is not a” are logically invalid.
“They’re an apt example precisely because they’re things that we routinely make perfect copies of and they have some small value.”
They lack feelings about themselves, and are thus a nonexample. Worse, they’re a special case — their value is /entirely limited/ to the value of the information they contain (you /can/ make this argument about humans, but not without being nihilistic.)
And you’re still making the wrong argument. The value of the copy to everyone else is unimportant. The question is the value of the copy to the original.
“Distinct how?”
In that it’s not the same. You can set them side-by-side and see that there are two of them, the one on the right and the one on the left.
“It occupies a slightly different location?”
It occupies a different location, it is made of different matter, and it constitutes a seperate consciouness. Object A doesn’t experience what Object B experiences, nor is the reverse true.
“In every other way it’s you.”
It’s like you. That doesn’t make it actually you. In the only way that matters (that being identity) it’s not you, you are.
“If exposed to the same stimuli immediately after the copying process, both of you will react the same way.”
But you won’t be. Your situations are different. And that’s not the intent in any case. The point is moot.
“Are you positing that the self incorporates some intangible, uncopyable “soul”? What special quality of “you-ness” can’t be copied?”
Nope. Only that you — the you that you are right now — didn’t move. It’s still there. And even if you kill it, it’s just been killed. The copy is not the original, and can never be.
October 8th, 2007 at 10:17 pm
Responding to my points with a (seemingly) articulate version of “nuh-uh!” doesn’t get us anywhere. This is one reason why I don’t like to argue (especially about philosophy) on the internet. I don’t buy your points and you’re obviously unwilling to consider mine, so I think the best thing would be to just drop the subject.